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CAT SCRATCH FEVER: THE SPREAD OF THE CAT’S 
PAW DOCTRINE IN THE SECOND CIRCUIT 
Crystal Jackson-Kaloz+ 
The term “cat’s paw” comes from a seventeenth century fable about a 
deceitful monkey and a gullible cat.1  The monkey convinces the cat to steal 
chestnuts roasting in a fire so that they can eat them together.  When the cat pulls 
out the last chestnut, he turns around and discovers that the monkey has eaten 
them all.  The monkey received what he wanted with no risk to himself, leaving 
the cat with nothing but a burnt paw.2 
Judge Richard Posner inserted the term “cat’s paw” into employment 
discrimination law when he used the term to describe situations where an 
employer is vicariously liable for the discriminatory bias of its subordinate.3  In 
2011, the Supreme Court adopted the “cat’s paw” doctrine in Staub v. Proctor 
Hospital.4  However, the Supreme Court only applied the “cat’s paw” doctrine 
to situations where an adverse employment decision5 was influenced by a 
supervisor who possessed a discriminatory or retaliatory intent against the 
employee but declined to consider whether the doctrine could be applied to 
decisions influenced by a co-worker.6 
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 1. Jean de La Fontaine, The Monkey and the Cat, MUSÉE JEAN DE LA FONTAINE, 
http://www.musee-jean-de-la-fontaine.fr/jean-de-la-fontaine-fable-uk-4.html (last visited Sept. 12, 
2016); accord The Monkey and the Cat, AESOPICA: AESOP FOR CHILDREN, http://mythfolklo 
re.net/aesopica/milowinter/61.htm (last visited Apr. 9, 2018). 
 2. See sources cited supra note 1. 
 3. Shager v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398, 405 (7th Cir. 1990). 
 4. 562 U.S. 411, 421–22 (2011). 
 5. The Second Circuit has broadly defined an “adverse employment action” to include: 
termination, failing to hire or promote, demotion, reduction in pay, reprimand, and some lesser 
actions.  See Lovejoy-Wilson v. NOCO Motor Fuel, Inc., 263 F.3d 208, 223 (2d Cir. 2001).  
Moreover, although federal employment discrimination law encompasses multiple anti-
discrimination statutes, the focus of this Note will center on Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, Pub. L. 88-352, 78 Stat. 253 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2012)). 
 6. Staub, 562 U.S. at 422 n.4 (“We express no view as to whether the employer would be 
liable if a co-worker, rather than a supervisor, committed a discriminatory act that influenced the 
ultimate employment decision.”).  For purposes of Title VII liability, the Supreme Court defined a 
supervisor as a person that “is empowered by the employer to take tangible employment actions 
against the victim.”  Vance v. Ball State Univ., 570 U.S. 421, 424 (2013). 
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On August 29, 2016, the Second Circuit expanded employer liability under 
the “cat’s paw” doctrine in Vasquez v. Empress Ambulance Service, Inc.7 to 
include the impermissible bias of a non-supervisory employee when it influences 
an employer’s adverse employment decision.  In Vasquez, the plaintiff filed an 
employment discrimination suit against her employer under both state and 
federal law, claiming that she was wrongfully terminated in retaliation for filing 
a sexual harassment complaint against a co-worker.  Specifically, while the 
employer investigated the plaintiff’s sexual harassment allegations, the co-
worker who was the subject of the complaint learned of the investigation.8  In 
response, the co-worker presented false evidence to the employer, alleging that 
he was the true victim of sexual harassment, and that it was the plaintiff who 
sexually harassed him.  Without further investigation and refusing to consider 
plaintiff’s evidence, the employer made the decision to fire her based solely on 
the self-serving evidence presented by the co-worker who was the subject of the 
original complaint.9 
The trial court, relying on Staub, granted the employer’s motion to dismiss 
and held that the co-worker’s retaliatory intent could not be imputed to the 
employer because he was not her supervisor.10  The Second Circuit reversed, 
holding that an employee may succeed in a retaliation claim under a “cat’s paw” 
theory “even absent evidence of illegitimate bias on the part of the ultimate 
decision maker, so long as the [co-worker] shown to have [an] impermissible 
bias played a meaningful role in the decision-making process.”11 
This Note examines the Second Circuit’s decision extending the “cat’s paw” 
doctrine to non-supervisory co-workers.  Part I provides an overview of the 
“cat’s paw” doctrine and discusses prior case law underlying the decision.  Part 
II provides a factual summary of Vasquez and the Second Circuit’s rationale.  
Part III explains why the Second Circuit’s holding was correct and suggests there 
is a need to define what a proper independent investigation entails.  Finally, this 
Note concludes by recommending measures employers should adopt to 
minimize the risk of a “cat’s paw” claim. 
I.  TITLE VII, AGENCY LAW, AND CAT’S PAW DOCTRINE 
A.  Where the Term “Cat’s Paw” Originates and What It Means 
In the 1990 decision Shager v. Upjohn Co.,12 Seventh Circuit Judge Richard 
Posner introduced the concept of “cat’s paw” liability when he used the term to 
                                                 
 7. 835 F.3d 267 (2d Cir. 2016). 
 8. Id. at 270. 
 9. Id. at 270–71. 
 10. Id. at 271–72. 
 11. Id. at 272 (quoting Holcomb v. Iona Coll., 521 F.3d 130, 143 (2d Cir. 2008)) (“Such a 
role is surely played by an employee who ‘manipulates’ an employer into acting as mere ‘conduit’ 
for his retaliatory intent.”). 
 12. 913 F.2d 398 (7th Cir. 1990). 
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describe situations where an employer is vicariously liable for the discriminatory 
bias of its subordinate.13 
In Shager, a fifty-three-year-old salesman filed a wrongful termination suit 
under the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA).14  The 
employee in Shager, a salesman for a seed manufacturing company, claimed his 
supervisor assigned him a tougher sales territory, treated him unfairly compared 
to younger salesmen, and recommended his termination despite his outstanding 
sales performance.15  The employer argued the committee that made the ultimate 
decision to terminate the employee did not have any bias toward him; therefore, 
it could not be liable even if the supervisor’s recommendation to terminate was 
based on the employee’s age.16  The court used well-established principles of 
agency law to hold that employers may be held liable when a biased supervisor 
influences an adverse employment action, even if the supervisor does not make 
the ultimate decision.17 
Today, the term “cat’s paw” is regularly used in employment discrimination 
cases to refer to situations where an employee has been subjected to an adverse 
employment decision by his or her employer (the gullible cat)—who has no 
discriminatory or retaliatory bias—but who has been manipulated or influenced 
by a subordinate supervisor (the deceitful monkey) who does possess an 
impermissible discriminatory or retaliatory bias.18 
B.  Agency Law and Title VII Claims 
Because there is no statute that specifically addresses vicarious liability for 
employment discrimination or retaliation claims, courts have developed the 
doctrine through case law.  However, the substantive basis for such claims are 
found under federal anti-discrimination statutes such as Title VII of the Civil 
Rights of 1964 (Title VII).19  Title VII makes it unlawful to discriminate against 
                                                 
 13. Id. at 405. 
 14. Pub. L. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (1967) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. ch. 14 (2012)). 
 15. Shager, 913 F.2d at 399–400.  The territory Shager was assigned consisted of poor quality 
farmland, and consequently the demand for seeds was low.  Despite being assigned to the territory 
with the worst sales potential, Shager surpassed the sales goals set for him and those of the salesmen 
assigned to territories with better sales potential.  Id. at 400. 
 16. Id. at 404. 
 17. Id. at 404–05 (holding that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether a 
supervisor’s age-based bias tainted the committee’s decision to fire the plaintiff). 
 18. See Sara Eber, Comment, How Much Power Should Be in the Paw? Independent 
Investigations and the Cat’s Paw Doctrine, 40 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 141, 146 (2008); accord Patrick 
Dorrian, Watch Out for Witness Bias in Workplace Investigations, BLOOMBERG BNA (Sept. 2, 
2016), https://www.bna.com/watch-witness-bias-n73014447157/. 
 19. Pub. L. 88-352, 78 Stat. 253 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 
(2012)).  In addition to Title VII, Congress enacted other anti-discrimination statutes “to deter 
workplace discrimination and allow plaintiffs to recover for unlawful workplace discrimination.”  
See Michael L. Fessinger, Note, Balancing the Reasonable Requirements of Employers and 
Veterans Living with Traumatic Brain Injury—The Modern U.S. Military’s “Signature Injury” is 
a Game Changer, 53 WASHBURN L.J. 327, 339 (2014) (citing ADEA, 29 U.S.C. ch. 14 (2012)); 
2018] Cat Scratch Fever 413 
an employee on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.20  Title 
VII also contains a provision prohibiting retaliation by an employer against 
employees who file discrimination charges or otherwise engage in protected 
activity.21 
Congress directed courts to interpret Title VII claims using agency 
principles.22  Courts regularly apply section 219 of the Restatement (Second) of 
Agency (the Restatement) to determine when an employer is liable for the 
actions of its employees.23  The section provides that: 
(1) A master is subject to liability for the torts of his servants 
committed while acting in the scope of their employment. 
(2) A master is not subject to liability for the torts of his servants acting 
outside the scope of their employment, unless: 
(a) the master intended the conduct or the consequences, or 
(b) the master was negligent or reckless, or 
(c) the conduct violated non-delegable duty of the master, or 
                                                 
Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (USERRA), Pub. L. 103-
353, 108 Stat. 3149 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 38 U.S.C. (2012)); Americans 
with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), Pub. L. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified as amended at 42 
U.S.C. §§ 12101–213 (2012)); and Family Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA), Pub. L. 103-3, 107 
Stat. 6 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. ch. 28 (2012))).  The ADA protects employees with 
disabilities by placing “an affirmative obligation on the employer to help employees perform the 
‘essential functions’ of a job,” and the FMLA prevents employers from dismissing an employee 
when he or she takes time away from work to manage personal or family illness.  42 U.S.C. §§ 
12101-213; 28 U.S.C. ch. 28. 
 20. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)–(2). 
 21. Id. § 2000e-3(a).  A retaliation claim is a separate claim and may proceed even if the 
underlying discrimination claim fails.  See, e.g., Sims v. MME Paulette Dry Cleaners, 580 F. Supp. 
593, 594 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (“Under Title VII, the act of retaliation is a separate violation, in and of 
itself, without regard to the plaintiff’s success or failure on the merits of the underlying 
discrimination claim.”).  To prove a retaliation case under Title VII, a plaintiff must show: “(1) that 
she engaged in activity protected by Title VII, (2) that an adverse employment action occurred, and 
(3) that a causal link existed between the protected activity and the adverse action.”  Gee v. Principi, 
289 F.3d 342, 345 (5th Cir. 2002). 
 22. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 791 (1998) (“[The] definition of 
employer in Title VII, as including an ‘agent,’ expressed Congress’s intent that courts look to 
traditional principles of the law of agency in devising standards of employer liability . . . .” (internal 
citations omitted)); Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986) (“Congress wanted 
courts to look to agency principles for guidance in this area. . . . Congress’s decision to define 
‘employer’ to include any ‘agent’ of an employer surely evinces an intent to place some limits on 
the acts of employees for which employers under Title VII are to be held responsible.” (internal 
citation omitted)); accord Glen Allen Staszewski, Using Agency Principles for Guidance in 
Finding Employer Liability for A Supervisor’s Hostile Work Environment Sexual Harassment, 48 
VAND. L. REV. 1057, 1067 (1995). 
 23. See, e.g., Faragher, 524 U.S. at 777 (concluding in the context of a hostile work 
environment case that “§219(2)(d) provides an appropriate starting point for determining liability”); 
EEOC v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of L.A., 450 F.3d 476, 487–88 (10th Cir. 2006) (relying on 
purpose of section 219 to determine causation standard of employer subordinate liability). 
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(d) the servant purported to act or to speak on behalf of the 
principal and there was reliance upon apparent authority, or 
he was aided in accomplishing the tort by the existence of 
the agency relation.24 
Section 219(1) establishes traditional vicarious liability in the employment 
context by holding an employer automatically liable if an employee’s challenged 
conduct falls within the scope of his employment.25  Whether conduct is within 
the scope of employment is generally determined by whether the conduct is 
performed “at least in part, by a purpose to serve the master.”26  However, an 
employee’s discriminatory or retaliatory conduct is typically never done with 
the purpose of serving the employer but, instead, is done solely for personal 
reasons, and courts often view such conduct as being outside the scope of 
employment.27  Thus, courts look to section 219(2) to determine if there are other 
justifications to hold an employer vicariously liable for the impermissible 
actions of the employee.28  In the absence of a statutory definition of vicarious 
liability within Title VII, courts have wide discretion to determine “when the 
employer is to be held liable for . . . its employees’ actions, and [what] standard 
of liability to impose on employers for the [impermissible] acts of their 
employees.”29 
C.  Vicarious Liability Standard for Employment Discrimination Defined 
The Supreme Court defined the standard for employer liability where an 
employee’s conduct is outside the scope of his employment in Burlington 
Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth.30  In that case, Kimberly Ellerth worked as a 
                                                 
 24. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219 (AM. LAW INST. 1958). 
 25. Id. § 219(1); see also Jennifer K. Weinhold, Note, Beyond the Traditional Scope-of-
Employment Analysis in the Clergy Sexual Abuse Context, 47 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 531, 539 
(2009) (“[T]raditional [agency] analysis maintains that ‘if an employee wholly abandons, even 
temporarily, the employer’s business for personal reasons, the act is not within the scope of 
employment, and the employer is not liable under respondeat superior for the employee’s conduct 
during that lapse.’” (quoting O’Shea v. Welch, 350 F.3d 1101, 1105 (10th Cir. 2003))). 
 26. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 228(1)(c).  For guidance in determining whether 
conduct falls “within the scope of employment,” see id. §§ 229–37. 
 27. See Burlington Indus., Inc., v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 759 (1998) (stating that harassment 
is not within the scope of employment because harassment is not motivated by intent to serve the 
employer). 
 28. Entente Mineral Co. v. Parker, 956 F.2d 524, 529 (5th Cir. 1992) (“[T]he principal’s 
liability is based on the theory embodied in §§ 219(2)(d) and 261 of the Restatement, rather than 
traditional ‘scope of employment’ liability contained in § 219(1).”); Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 
833 F.2d 1406, 1418 (10th Cir. 1987) (“Although § 219(1) of the Restatement of Agency provides 
scant assistance in assessing employer liability under Title VII, § 219(2) is more helpful.”). 
 29. Justin P. Smith, Note, Letting the Master Answer: Employer Liability for Sexual 
Harassment in the Workplace After Faragher and Burlington Industries, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1786, 
1789 (1999). 
 30. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 758–59. 
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salesperson for Burlington Industries.31  As part of her duties, Ellerth was 
required to speak regularly with Ted Slowik, the vice president of sales and 
marketing.32  Ellerth alleged that she was sexually harassed by Slowik on a 
constant basis33 and eventually resigned because of it.34  Although, Slowik had 
limited authority to make hiring and promotion decisions, Slowik was not 
Ellerth’s direct supervisor.  However, her supervisor reported directly to 
Slowik.35 
The Supreme Court in Ellerth applied principles of agency law to hold that an 
employer may be held liable for the improper conduct of an employee’s actions 
that are outside the scope of his or her employment in two instances.36  First, 
under section 219(2)(d) of the Restatement, the employer may be held liable if 
the employee was “aided in accomplishing [his improper act] by the existence 
of the agency relationship.”37  Second, under section 219(2)(b), an employer 
may be liable when an employee’s improper conduct “is attributable to the 
employer’s own negligence.”38 
                                                 
 31. Id. at 747. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. at 747–48.  Ellerth alleged: (1) after Slowik made remarks about her breasts, she 
ignored him but, in response, he told her to “loosen” up and warned her that he could make her life 
easy or hard at Burlington Industries; (2) during an interview for a promotion, Slowik told her he 
was concerned about her promotion because she was not “loose enough” and rubbed her knee; and 
(3) when Slowik informed her by telephone that she received the promotion she was seeking, he 
added that she would be working with men in factories and that they “like women with pretty 
butts/legs.”  Id. 
 34. Initially Ellerth’s stated grounds for resignation were unrelated to Slowik’s conduct, but 
three weeks later, she alleged that her resignation was motivated by the sexual harassment she 
experienced from Slowik.  Id. at 748–49. 
 35. Id. at 747. 
 36. Id. at 758 (“Scope of employment does not define the only basis for employer liability 
under agency principles [and] [i]n limited circumstances, agency principles impose liability on 
employers even where employees commit torts outside the scope of employment.”). 
 37. Id. at 760 (noting that most employees are “aided in accomplishing their tortious 
objectives” because of the close proximity and regular contact provided by the employment 
relationship and would not have had access to the injured plaintiff otherwise).  Under the “aided in 
accomplishing” standard, the Court “evaluates the principal’s liability based on the degree to which 
the employment relationship facilitated the employee’s intentional tort.”  Weinhold, supra note 25, 
at 540. 
 38. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 758.  Section 213 of the Restatement states: 
A person conducting an activity through servants or other agents is subject to liability for 
harm resulting from his conduct if he is negligent or reckless: 
(a) in giving improper or ambiguous orders of [sic] in failing to make 
proper regulations; or 
(b) in the employment of improper persons or instrumentalities in work 
involving risk of harm to others; or 
(c) in the supervision of the activity; or 
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D.  Judicial Development of the Cat’s Paw Doctrine 
1.  The Circuits Split Hairs over the Causation Standard 
Following Judge Posner’s holding in Shager, “most circuits have adopted 
some form of the cat’s paw doctrine.”39  However, those courts have applied 
inconsistent standards regarding the level of influence over the adverse 
employment decision that is necessary for an employee’s impermissible bias to 
be imputed to the employer.40  In Shager, because the firing decision was made 
by an independent committee—rather than the allegedly biased supervisor—the 
court focused on whether the supervisor’s impermissible prejudice “tainted” the 
committee’s decision.  If the non-firing supervisor’s bias had any influence in 
the committee’s decision to fire Shager, then a “causal link between that 
prejudice and Shager’s discharge” exists sufficient to impute liability to the 
employer.41 
Although several circuits adopted the “any influence” approach used in 
Shager,42 the Fourth Circuit adopted the strictest approach, which requires the 
biased subordinate to be “principally responsible for the decision or the actual 
decision-maker for the employer.”43  Notably, the Tenth Circuit established a 
middle-ground approach that requires a “causal connection” between the biased 
subordinate’s actions and the adverse employment action.44 
2.  Supreme Court Accepts the Cat’s Paw Doctrine and Creates a New 
Standard 
The U.S. Supreme Court resolved the circuit split in Staub v. Proctor 
Hospital.45  However, instead of adopting one of the three standards established 
                                                 
(d) in permitting, or failing to prevent, negligent or other tortious conduct 
by persons, whether or not his servants or agents, upon premises or with 
instrumentalities under his control. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 213 (AM. LAW INST. 1958). 
 39. Eber, supra note 18, at 147; accord Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt., 354 F.3d 
277, 289 (4th Cir. 2004) (recognizing Shager v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398 (7th Cir. 1990), as the 
predecessor to other courts’ application of the “cat’s paw” doctrine). 
 40. See Eber, supra note 18, at 147, 154–75 (discussing the different standards of causation 
used by the courts). 
 41. Shager, 913 F.2d at 405. 
 42. See, e.g., Santiago-Ramos v. Centennial P.R. Wireless Corp., 217 F.3d 46, 55 (1st Cir. 
2000) (direct supervisor was in position to influence the decision-maker); Rose v. N.Y.C. Bd. of 
Educ., 257 F.3d 156, 162 (2d Cir. 2001) (immediate supervisor had “enormous influence” in the 
decision-making process). 
 43. Hill, 354 F.3d at 290 (holding that a subordinate must possess some kind of supervisory 
authority and must be the actual decision-maker of the adverse employment decision). 
 44. EEOC v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of L.A., 450 F.3d 476, 487–88 (10th Cir. 2006) 
(holding that more than mere influence and more than mere input must be established in the 
decision-making process to satisfy the element of causation). 
 45. Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411, 418 (2011). 
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by the circuit courts, the Supreme Court established a new “proximate cause” 
standard for analyzing a “cat’s paw” theory of liability.46 
In that case, plaintiff Vincent Staub was an angiography technician at Proctor 
Hospital and a member of the U.S. Army Reserve.47  As an Army Reserve 
soldier, Staub was required to be absent from Proctor Hospital to attend monthly 
drills and one two-week training session during the year.48  Staub claimed that 
his immediate supervisor Jane Mulally and her supervisor Michael Korenchuk 
harbored hostility toward him because of his military obligations and consequent 
absences from work.49 
Specifically, he alleged that Mulally issued a Corrective Action against him 
for fabricated reasons.50  Then, shortly thereafter, another co-worker filed a 
complaint with the Vice-President of Human Resources Linda Buck and the 
Chief Operating Officer Garrett McGowen regarding Staub’s “frequent 
unavailability and abruptness.”  As a result, McGowen directed Buck and 
Korenchuk to develop a performance improvement plan to remedy Staub’s 
“unavailability problems.”51  However, before the plan could be put into place, 
                                                 
 46. Writing for the Court, Justice Scalia posited: 
Proximate cause requires only “some direct relation between the injury asserted and the 
injurious conduct alleged,” and excludes only those “link[s] that [are] too remote, purely 
contingent, or indirect.”  We do not think that the ultimate decisionmaker’s exercise of 
judgment automatically renders the link to the supervisor’s bias “remote” or “purely 
contingent.”  The decisionmaker’s exercise of judgment is also a proximate cause of the 
employment decision, but it is common for injuries to have multiple proximate causes. 
Id. at 419–20 (alteration in original) (footnote omitted) (internal citation omitted) (quoting Hemi 
Group, LLC v. City of N.Y., 559 U.S. 1, 9 (2010)). 
 47. Id. at 413. 
 48. Id. at 413–14. 
 49. Id. at 414.  Mulally often scheduled Staub to work during his mandatory training sessions 
or made him use vacation time “so that he would ‘pa[y] back the department for everyone else 
having to bend over backwards to cover [his] schedule.’”  She also openly discussed her discontent 
with Staub’s “military duty” and her desire to “get rid of him” with other staff members.  Likewise, 
Korenchuk expressed his discontent with Staub’s military service by referring to his obligations to 
the military as “a b[u]nch of smoking and joking and [a] waste of taxpayers[‘] money.”  Id. 
(alteration in original). 
 50. The Corrective Action was a “disciplinary warning for purportedly violating a company 
rule requiring him to stay in his work area whenever he was not working with a patient.” Id.  In 
litigation, Staub contended that “Mulally’s justification for the Corrective Action was false for two 
reasons: [1] the company rule invoked by Mulally did not exist; and [2] even if it did, Staub did not 
violate it.”  Id. 
 51. Id. 
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Korenchuk filed another complaint against Staub claiming that he violated the 
Corrective Action,52 and Buck fired him.53 
Staub filed suit against Proctor Hospital under the Uniformed Services 
Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (USERRA)54 claiming that 
Mulally and Korenchuck’s complaints were motivated by their anti-military 
bias, which influenced Buck’s decision to fire him.55  The jury found in favor of 
Staub, and Proctor Hospital appealed to the Seventh Circuit.56  The Seventh 
Circuit reversed, holding that an employer may be held liable only where a 
biased supervisor exercised “singular influence” over the decision maker, and 
the adverse employment decision was made in “blind reliance” on the 
supervisor’s actions.57 
In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court applied tort and agency 
principles to hold that liability could be imputed to an employer under the “cat’s 
paw” doctrine: “[I]f a supervisor performs an act motivated by antimilitary 
animus that is intended by the supervisor to cause an adverse employment 
action, and if that act is a proximate cause of the ultimate employment action, 
then the employer is liable under USERRA.”58  The Court suggested that an 
employer may be able to avoid “cat’s paw” liability if an independent 
investigation uncovers a legitimate reason for the adverse employment decision 
that is “unrelated to the supervisor’s original biased action.”59  However, the 
                                                 
 52. In his complaint, Korenchuk alleged that Staub violated Mulally’s previously issued 
Corrective Action by leaving his desk without informing a supervisor.  At trial, Staub contended 
that the “accusation was false: He had left Korenchuk a voice-mail notification that he was leaving 
his desk.”  Id. at 414–15. 
 53. Id. at 415 (“Buck relied on Korenchuk’s accusation, however, and after reviewing Staub’s 
personnel file, she decided to fire him.”). 
 54. Pub. L. 103-353, 108 Stat. 3149 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 38 U.S.C. 
(2012)).  The purpose of USERRA is to protect veterans who are rejoining the workforce after 
completing their military service obligations from anti-military discrimination in the workplace.  
For an in-depth discussion regarding USERRA, see Elizabeth A. Leyda, Note, The War(riors) at 
Home: Examining USERRA’s Veterans’ Reemployment Protections When Hostility Follows 
Soldiers to the Workplace, 28 GA. ST. U.L. REV. 851, 852 (2012). 
 55. Staub, 562 U.S. at 414–15. 
 56. Id. at 415. 
 57. Id. at 415–16. 
 58. Id. at 422 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). 
 59. Specifically, the Court posited that, 
if the employer’s investigation results in an adverse action for reasons unrelated to the 
supervisor’s original biased action . . . , then the employer will not be liable. But the 
supervisor’s biased report may remain a causal factor if the independent investigation 
takes it into account without determining that the adverse action was, apart from the 
supervisor’s recommendation, entirely justified.  We are aware of no principle in tort or 
agency law under which an employer’s mere conduct of an independent investigation has 
a claim-preclusive effect.  Nor do we think the independent investigation somehow 
relieves the employer of “fault.” 
Id. 
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Court failed to provide guidance on what a sufficient independent investigation 
entails. 
Although the Court significantly clarified the standard for “cat’s paw” claims 
involving supervisors, it declined to consider whether a “cat’s paw” claim could 
be made for an adverse employment action caused by the bias of a low-level, 
non-supervisory co-worker.60 
E.  Judicial Expansion of the Cat’s Paw Doctrine 
The question left unanswered by Staub has caused mixed results among the 
courts regarding the imputed bias of a co-worker under the “cat’s paw” doctrine.  
For example, lower courts within the Fourth and Seventh Circuits have indicated 
some support for extending “cat’s paw” liability to the impermissible bias of 
non-supervisory employees.61  However, courts in the Sixth and Tenth Circuits 
have opposed extending the doctrine to encompass non-supervisory 
employees.62 
The First Circuit, in Velázquez-Perez v. Developers Diversified Realty 
Corp.,63 was the first federal circuit court to decide that a “cat’s paw” claim can 
proceed against an employer if a co-worker’s discriminatory intent influences 
an adverse employment decision.  In that case, Antonio Velázquez-Perez filed a 
Title VII claim against his former employer for sex discrimination and 
retaliation.64  He alleged that Rosa Martinez, a human resources (HR) 
representative, devised a scheme to get him fired after he rejected her romantic 
advances.65  Velázquez claimed that he and Martinez were friendly and often 
exchanged e-mails that were sometimes flirtatious.66  However, Martinez 
“expressed her romantic interest more explicitly” when she tried to gain entrance 
                                                 
 60. Id. at 422 n.4 (“We express no view as to whether the employer would be liable if a co-
worker, rather than a supervisor, committed the discriminatory act that influenced the ultimate 
employment decision.”). 
 61. See, e.g., Alamjamili v. Berglund Chevrolet, Inc., No. 7:09-CV-213, 2011 WL 1479101, 
at *31–32 n.3 (W.D. Va. Apr. 18, 2011) (holding that because the plaintiff never alleged that any 
other person influenced his admittedly non-biased supervisor’s decision to fire him, Staub’s “cat’s 
paw” theory of liability was not applicable); Johnson v. Koppers, Inc., No. 10 C 3404, 2012 WL 
1906448, at *6 (N.D. Ill. May 12, 2012) (finding that Staub “neither precludes nor endorses” claims 
based on whether a non-supervisory co-worker’s impermissible bias can me imputed to the 
employer under the “cat’s paw” doctrine). 
 62. See, e.g., Hysten v. Burlington N. Santa Fe Ry. Co., 415 F. App’x 897, 912 (10th Cir. 
2011) (finding no cat’s paw liability because the biased actors were the plaintiff’s co-workers with 
“no supervisory authority or influence with respect to [the plaintiff], including authority or 
influence relating to employee discipline”); Voltz v. Erie Cty., 617 Fed. App’x 417, 424 (6th Cir. 
2015) (recognizing that the Sixth Circuit only extends cat’s paw liability to Human Resources 
employees because, like supervisors, they can “effect a significant change in employment status”). 
 63. 753 F.3d 265 (1st Cir. 2014). 
 64. Id. at 267. 
 65. Id. at 267–69. 
 66. Id. at 268. 
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into his room during a business trip.  He told her then that he was not interested 
in a romantic relationship.67 
Shortly after the trip, Martinez began sending Velázquez angry e-mails 
threatening his job security.68  Velázquez mentioned the e-mails to one of his 
supervisors who told him to send her a “conciliatory e-mail” so that she would 
not “get [him] terminated”; his supervisor and another man proceeded to 
jokingly advise him to have sex with Martinez.69  During this time, Martinez 
also began complaining about Velázquez’s work performance to his 
supervisors.70  When her complaints only resulted in a warning memorandum 
and the issuance of a Performance Improvement Plan, she went over the 
supervisors’ heads by filing a complaint and recommendation for termination 
with senior officials at the company’s headquarters.71  Shortly thereafter, 
Velázquez was fired.72 
The First Circuit determined that the employer was not “necessarily 
absolve[d] . . . of potential liability for Velázquez’s discharge” simply because 
Martinez was not his supervisor.73  Applying negligence-based agency 
principles, the First Circuit held that: 
an employer can be held liable under Title VII if: the plaintiff’s co-
worker makes statements maligning the plaintiff, for discriminatory 
reasons and with the intent to cause the plaintiff’s firing; the co-
worker’s discriminatory acts proximately cause the plaintiff to be 
fired; and the employer acts negligently by allowing the co-worker’s 
                                                 
 67. Specifically, the record indicated that Martinez followed Velázquez to his room, tried to 
force her way in, and stood outside of his door until he threatened to call hotel security.  
Immediately after, Martinez sent Velázquez several e-mails and also e-mailed another female 
employee who she saw him talking to earlier “suggesting that Velázquez was going to have sex 
with the woman.”  Id. 
 68. In the days that followed the rejection at the hotel, Martinez and Velázquez exchanged 
several e-mails in which he “firmly stated that he had no interest in a romantic relationship and 
asked Martinez to respect that decision.” Id.  In response, 
Martinez wrote, for example, “I don’t have to take revenge on anyone; if somebody 
knows your professional weaknesses, that person is me.”  In another e-mail in the same 
chain, [she] said, “you disappoint me and . . . are not even half of what you boast you 
are,” adding, “I cannot allow any of you to risk the team’s success.” 
Id. 
 69. Id. at 268. 
 70. Id. at 269. 
 71. During another business trip, Martinez once again followed Velázquez to his hotel room 
and told him that she loved him and not her husband.  After Velázquez rejected her again, she sent 
an e-mail to the company’s senior officials in Ohio stating that “because [Velázquez’s] behavior 
has been against the company code of conduct and has already impacted the trust from other team 
members . . . [i]t is my recommendation this person [be] terminated immediately.”  Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 273. 
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acts to achieve their desired effect though it knows (or reasonably 
should know) of the discriminatory motivation.74 
II.  EXPANSION OF THE CAT’S PAW DOCTRINE CONTINUES IN THE SECOND 
CIRCUIT 
On August 29, 2016, the Second Circuit issued its opinion in Vasquez v. 
Empress Ambulance Service, Inc., and joined the First Circuit in expanding the 
scope of the “cat’s paw” doctrine to co-workers.75 
A.  The Facts 
In Vasquez, Andrea Vasquez had been working as an emergency medical 
technician for Empress Ambulance Service, Inc. (Empress) for only a few 
months when she met Tyrell Gray, one of the company’s dispatchers.76  Gray 
began flirting with Vasquez shortly after they met.  His flirting made Vasquez 
uncomfortable, and she repeatedly denied his requests to go out.77  A few months 
later, Gray again asked her out, to which Vasquez replied that she had a 
boyfriend and was not interested in dating him.78  Gray told her that he would 
send her something special later that night that would make her forget about her 
boyfriend.79 
While Vasquez was out on a shift, Gray sent Vasquez a picture of his erect 
penis, asking her what she thought.  When Vasquez returned to the office, she 
was visibly upset and immediately told her supervisor.80  The supervisor put her 
in an office to type out a formal complaint and assured her that the situation 
would be dealt with.  When Gray returned to the office, he noticed Vasquez 
crying at the computer.81  He asked her if she was reporting him.  After she 
ignored him, he left.82 
Once Vasquez completed her report, she met with her supervisor and the HR 
director.  As she recounted her story, she offered to show them the text messages 
                                                 
 74. Id. at 274. 
 75. Vasquez v. Empress Ambulance Serv. Inc., 835 F.3d 267, 276 (2d Cir. 2016). 
 76. Id. at 269. 
 77. Id. at 269–70 (“Over the course of their acquaintance, Gray ‘constantly asked [Vasquez] 
out on dates,’ ‘attempted to flirt with her,’ and ‘repeatedly . . . put his arm around her or touched 
her shoulders,’ causing Vasquez ‘to be extremely uncomfortable’ as she tried to reject his 
advances.” (alteration in original)). 
 78. Id. at 270. 
 79. When Vasquez told him she had a boyfriend, he “insisted that ‘I bet I can make you leave 
your man’ and promised to ‘send . . . something between you and me.’”  Id. (alteration in original). 
 80. Id. 
 81. Gray walked into the office, “to see a visually distressed [Vasquez] crying and typing at 
the computer.  Gray, noticeably nervous, asked Vasquez if she was ok and, after Vasquez declined 
to engage his attempts at conversation, stated, You’re reporting me, right?”  Id. (internal quotations 
omitted). 
 82. Id. 
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from Gray;83 however, both declined the invitation.84  While Vasquez made her 
report, Gray frantically sought to undermine her report.  After telling another co-
worker that he thought Vasquez was reporting him, he asked that co-worker to 
tell their supervisor that he and Vasquez were in relationship.85 
When the co-worker refused, Gray began doctoring his text messages to make 
it seem as if he and Vasquez were in a sexual relationship by combining screen 
shots of portions of his conversations with Vasquez and another woman.86  He 
printed the screenshots and showed them to the supervisor and a representative 
from HR.  He included a racy self-photo of a woman with only a small portion 
of her face visible claiming it was Vasquez and that she had sent him the photo 
in response to his photo.87 
Shortly after Gray met with HR, Vasquez had a meeting with her union 
representatives, the owner of Empress, and HR to discuss the investigation.88  
She was told they spoke with Gray, and after considering his evidence, they 
determined she had been in an “inappropriate sexual relationship” with him.  
They then informed her she was being fired for engaging in sexual harassment.89  
Although Vasquez vehemently denied the accusations and urged them to look at 
her cell phone as proof that no such conversations between her and Gray ever 
occurred, they refused.  Additionally, she denied the existence of any photo, and 
when she requested to see it, they refused her request.90 
Vasquez filed suit against Empress under Title VII and the New York State 
Human Rights Law claiming she was wrongfully terminated in retaliation for 
her sexual harassment complaint.91  Empress filed a motion to dismiss, which 
the district court, applying Staub, granted and dismissed Vasquez’s complaint 
                                                 
 83. The supervisor and HR director “thanked Vasquez for ‘telling [her] story,’ assured her 
that, ‘[w]e don’t tolerate this sort of behavior here,’ and promised to ‘sort the situation out.’” 
 84. The court noted that after this exchange: 
To aid in their investigation, Vasquez offered to show the supervisors Gray’s messages 
on her cell phone, but they rejected the offer.  They then asked Vasquez whether she 
preferred to go home or to wait in the office while they investigated the incident that 
morning, and Vasquez elected to wait. 
Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 271. 
 88. Id. at 270. 
 89. Id. at 270–71 (“[T]he [investigative] committee had already considered Gray’s documents 
and had concluded that Vasquez was ‘having an inappropriate sexual relationship’ with Gray.”). 
 90. Vasquez was informed “that Gray had shown them ‘a racy self-taken photo’ that Vasquez 
had allegedly sent in response to Gray’s explicit picture message, which they considered ‘proof that 
[Vasquez] had been sexually harassing [Gray]’”  After denying the allegation and contending that 
Gray was lying, the firing supervisor “insisted that ‘the committee had all seen the photograph’ and 
‘kn[ew] it was [her in the photo].’”—despite the fact that the “photo depicted only ‘a small fraction 
of a face’ that could ‘by no means [be] concluded to be that of [Vasquez].’”  Id. 
 91. Although Vasquez involves claims on both state and federal anti-discrimination statutes, 
this Note focuses exclusively on federal anti-discrimination law. 
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on grounds that Gray’s retaliatory intent could not be imputed to Empress 
because he was not her supervisor.92 
B.  The Holding 
The Second Circuit “vacated the [district] court’s decision and remand[ed] 
[Vasquez’s claim] for further proceedings.”93  Writing for the court, Circuit 
Judge Calabresi employed the negligence-based agency principles used in 
Ellerth to hold that employers may be held liable under the “cat’s paw” doctrine 
for an employee’s discriminatory or retaliatory bias—regardless of the 
employee’s position in the company—if the employer negligently gives effect 
to the unlawful bias by causing the “victim to suffer an adverse employment 
decision.”94 
The Second Circuit supported its decision by relying on the Supreme Court’s 
reasoning in Ellerth, notwithstanding the fact that Ellerth involved a hostile 
work environment claim.95  Judge Calabresi explained: 
Significantly, in addressing employer culpability for employee 
misconduct, the Ellerth Court expressly noted that Section 219(2)(b) 
[of the Restatement] holds employers liable “when the [employee’s] 
tort is attributable to the employer’s own negligence.  Thus, although 
a[n employee’s] sexual harassment is outside the scope of 
employment . . . , an employer can be liable, nonetheless, where its 
own negligence is a cause of the harassment[, . . . i.e.,] if it knew or 
should have known about the conduct but failed to stop it.”96 
Analogizing Vasquez’s Title VII claim to the sexual harassment claim in 
Ellerth, Judge Calabresi determined that Gray’s status as a low-level employee 
could not “shield Empress from [liability] for Gray’s conduct” because, “under 
Ellerth and agency law,” Gray was an agent of Empress sufficient to “hold 
Empress accountable for his unlawful intent.”97 
Focusing on Empress’s “blind faith” reliance on Gray’s accusations and its 
failure to give any consideration to Vasquez’s contradictory evidence, the 
Second Circuit found that a reasonable jury could find that Empress had been 
negligent in firing Vasquez.98  However, it noted that an employer does not 
                                                 
 92. Vasquez, 835 F.3d at 269. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 269, 273–74. 
 95. Id. at 273 (citing Burlington Indus., Inc., v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 758–59 (1998)) (“We 
see no reason why Ellerth, though written in the context of hostile work environment, should not 
also be read to hold an employer liable under Title VII . . . .”). 
 96. Id. at 273 (alteration in original) (quoting Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 758–59). 
 97. Id. at 274 (“Once deemed Empress’s agent, Gray stands in the same shoes as Staub’s 
‘supervisor,’ and is equally able to play the monkey to Empress’s cat.”). 
 98. Id. at 276.  The Second Circuit determined that Empress’s failure to fully investigate the 
matter—by refusing to consider Vasquez’s evidence—constituted negligence that gave effect to 
Gray’s impermissible motive.  Id. at 274 n.6. 
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automatically expose itself to liability by acting on information provided by a 
biased employee, instead courts must consider whether the employee’s bias 
played a meaningful role in the adverse decision.99  It explained that employers 
“can still ‘just get it wrong’ without incurring liability under Title VII,” they just 
cannot get it wrong by negligently allowing “itself to be used as a [cat’s paw] 
for even a low-level employee’s” improper bias.100 
III.  SECOND CIRCUIT DECISION WAS CORRECT TO EXPAND THE CAT’S PAW 
DOCTRINE TO CO-WORKERS 
The Second Circuit’s decision to expand an employer’s “cat’s paw” liability 
to discriminatory or retaliatory acts of its co-workers is consistent with the 
purpose of Title VII and agency principles. 
A.  The Decision Is Consistent with the Purpose of Title VII 
The primary purpose of Title VII is to avoid harm to employees by ridding 
the workplace of discrimination and any retaliation that may follow for reporting 
acts of discrimination.101  Restricting discrimination and retaliation claims to 
only the discriminatory acts of a biased supervisor while allowing the same 
discriminatory acts of co-workers clearly undermines the goals of Title VII.102  
Further, the Second Circuit noted that in accordance with Title VII precedent, 
plaintiffs are entitled to succeed on claims of discrimination against even non-
                                                 
 99. Id. at 275–76.  The Second Circuit noted that: 
Empress’s alleged negligence—in crediting Gray’s accusations to the exclusion of all 
other evidence, and specifically declining to examine contrary evidence tendered by 
Vasquez, when it knew or, with reasonable investigation, should have known of Gray’s 
retaliatory animus—caused Gray’s accusations to form the sole basis for Empress’s 
decision to terminate Vasquez.  Thus, as a result of Empress’s negligence, Gray achieved 
a “meaningful,” and indeed decisive, role in Vasquez’s termination. 
Id. at 275. 
 100. Id. (stating that courts consider “what ‘motivated’ the employer rather than . . . ‘the truth 
of the allegations’” the employer relied upon). 
 101. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 764 (“Title VII is designed to encourage the creation of anti-
harassment policies and effective grievance mechanisms.”); accord EEOC v. Shell Oil Co., 466 
U.S. 54, 77 (1984) (“The dominant purpose of [Title VII], of course, is to root out discrimination 
in employment.”). 
 102. This point was best illustrated by a case out of the D.C. Circuit, which explained: 
To hold that an employer cannot be reached for Title VII violations unknown to him is, 
too, to open the door to circumvention of Title VII by the simple expedient of looking 
the other way, even as signs of discriminatory practice begin to gather on the horizon.  
As the Ninth Circuit has said, “such a rule would create an enormous loophole in the 
statutes,” one we think the courts should strive to seal. Instead of providing a reason for 
employers to remain oblivious to conditions in the workplace, we think the enlightened 
purpose of Title VII calls for an interpretation cultivating an incentive for employers to 
take a more active role in warranting to each employee that he or she will enjoy a working 
environment free from illegal . . . discrimination. 
Vinson v. Taylor, 753 F.2d 141, 151 (D.C. Cir. 1985), aff’d sub nom. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. 
Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986) (footnotes omitted). 
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biased employers as long as the biased individual “played a meaningful role in 
the [decision-making] process.”  It then relied on that reasoning to hold that an 
employee clearly plays a meaningful role when he “‘manipulates’ an employer 
into acting as mere ‘conduit’ for his [impermissible] intent.”103 
B.  The Decision Is Consistent with Principles of Agency Law 
The Supreme Court in Ellerth and Staub make clear that agency principles 
govern the “cat’s paw” doctrine.104  As mentioned above, the Supreme Court in 
Staub determined that a supervisor is an agent of the employer by applying 
Section 219(1) of the Restatement because it found that the supervisors in Staub 
were acting within the scope of their employment.  It did not, however, adopt a 
bright-line rule to impute liability to the employer exclusively for the 
impermissible bias of supervisors.105 
Pursuant to section 219(2)(b) of the Restatement, an employer is subject to 
liability for the torts of its employees even when acting outside the scope of their 
employment, if it is found that the employer was “negligent or reckless.”106  
Although Gray’s manipulative conduct was well outside the scope of his 
employment, Empress’s negligence in the matter could give rise to liability for 
Gray’s retaliatory motive.  Particularly, because Vasquez filed a sexual 
harassment complaint against him just a few hours before, a reasonable 
employer would suspect or should suspect that Gray had a retaliatory motive in 
proffering his evidence.107  Therefore, by refusing to consider the counter-
evidence proffered by Vasquez, Empress “negligently chose to credit his, and 
only his, account” in deciding to terminate Vasquez.108 
Thus, in reaching its decision, the Second Circuit correctly applied Title VII 
precedent and section 219(2)(b) of the Restatement to determine that the “cat’s 
paw” doctrine extends employer liability to the actions of co-workers when the 
employer negligently gives effect to the co-worker’s discriminatory or 
retaliatory intent. 
                                                 
 103. Vasquez, 835 F.3d at 272. 
 104. Staub v. Proctor Hospital, 562 U.S. 411, 422 (2011); Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 764–65. 
 105. Staub, 562 U.S. at 422–23 & n.4 (“We express no view as to whether the employer would 
be liable if a co-worker, rather than a supervisor, committed a discriminatory act that influenced 
the ultimate employment decision.”). 
 106. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2)(b) (AM. LAW INST. 1958). 
 107. The nature and timing of Gray’s evidence was suspicious.  Only a few hours had passed 
from the time of Gray sending the text message and Vasquez filing her complaint, yet, Gray 
conveniently was carrying around printed screenshots of his text messages with Vasquez.  
Appellant’s Brief at 20–21, Vasquez v. Empress Ambulance Serv. Inc., 835 F.3d 267 (2d Cir. 
2016).  In addition, Gray told his supervisors and HR that Vasquez sent the racy photo to him in 
response to his text.  However, Vasquez was out on a shift when she received the text, filed her 
complaint immediately upon her return, and waited in the office until her meeting with the 
supervisors and HR.  Id. at 20–21. 
 108. Vasquez, 835 F.3d at 275. 
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C.  Independent Investigation Guidelines Still Needed 
Independent investigations are a crucial step in protecting employers against 
“cat’s paw” claims.  Courts have implied that employers are likely to be absolved 
of “cat’s paw” liability where a sufficient independent investigation shows the 
adverse employment action was based on reasons wholly unrelated to the 
original bias.109  In other words, an independent investigation may sever the link 
of causation between the biased employee and the adverse employment 
action.110 
For example, if in the course conducting an independent investigation of 
Gray’s claims, Empress had discovered that Vasquez was guilty of violating the 
company’s policy regarding cell phone use while driving an ambulance, 
Empress would be less likely to be found liable under the “cat’s paw” doctrine.  
Well-defined standards for independent investigations would provide employers 
with an effective defense to “cat’s paw” claims and reduce the risk of 
litigation.111  Furthermore, encouraging independent investigations promotes the 
purpose of Title VII—ridding the workplace of discrimination.112  Thus, the 
Supreme Court should provide guidelines and identify standards that could guide 
future courts in determining whether an investigation is sufficient to avoid “cat’s 
paw” liability. 
IV.  PUTTING AN END TO MONKEY BUSINESS IN THE WORKPLACE 
As a result of the Vasquez decision, employees have been given greater 
protection under Title VII.  However, employers now face greater exposure to 
liability in “cat’s paw” claims, especially in regard to how they investigate and 
                                                 
 109. See, e.g., Staub, 562 U.S. at 421; Clack v. Rock-Tenn Co., 304 F. App’x 399, 408 (6th 
Cir. 2008) (Moore, J. dissenting) (acknowledging that “the fact of an independent investigation is 
an important factor”); EEOC v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of L.A., 450 F.3d 476, 486 (10th Cir. 
2006) (noting other Circuits’ acceptances of absolving employers when there is an independent 
investigation); Collins v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 305 F.3d 113, 119 (2d Cir. 2002) (holding that 
termination was proper after an independent investigation was based on “substantial evidence, of 
an undisputedly independent, neutral, and unbiased adjudicator”). 
 110. See Staub, 562 U.S. at 421; Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt., 354 F.3d 277, 289 
(4th Cir. 2004); accord Sara Atherton Mason, Note, Cat’s Paw Cases: The Standard for Assessing 
Subordinate Bias Liability, 38 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 435, 446–47 (2011); Curtis J. Thomas, Note, 
Cat’s in the Cradle: Tenth Circuit Provides Silver Spoon of Subordinate Bias Liability in EEOC v. 
Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Los Angeles, 61 OKLA. L. REV. 629, 663–64 (2008) (providing a general 
discussion on independent investigations). 
 111. The EEOC argued in its appellate brief to the Supreme Court that “the more thorough, 
balanced, and truly independent the investigation, the more likely the termination will be the result 
of the investigation rather than the discriminatory input.”  Brief for Respondent at 35, BCI Coca-
Cola Bottling Co. of L.A. v. EEOC, 127 S. Ct. 852 (2007) (No. 06-341), 2007 WL 951131. 
 112. See Eber, supra note 18, at 194; see also Thomas, supra note 110, at 663 (“The 
independent investigation requirement is correct because it serves the purpose of Title VII by 
ensuring that employees who are the victims of intentional discrimination can recover even though 
the persons who made the adverse employment decision did not act with any bias.”). 
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respond to discrimination complaints.113  While the Vasquez decision and the 
cases before it failed to clarify specific standards of a sufficient independent 
investigation, some guidance can be found by looking at the U.S. Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission’s (EEOC) guidelines and other court 
decisions regarding Title VII “cat’s paw” claims.114 
A.  EEOC Guidelines 
In 1999, the EEOC issued guidelines for the enforcement of vicarious liability 
for unlawful harassment by supervisors.115  Although the guidelines were issued 
specifically for discrimination by supervisors, they can easily be applied to 
discrimination by co-workers.  The EEOC urges employers to “set up a 
mechanism for a prompt, thorough, and impartial investigation into alleged 
[discrimination].”116  When choosing an investigator, the EEOC instructs that 
“the individual who conducts the investigation [should] objectively gather and 
consider the relevant facts.”117  Specifically, the investigator should be skilled 
in interviewing and evaluating the credibility of witnesses, and the alleged 
wrongdoer should not have any “direct or indirect control” over the 
investigator.118 
B.  Judicial Guidance 
One example of a sufficient independent investigation is found in Sirpal v. 
University of Miami.119  In Sirpal, an Indian-American student claimed that 
racial discrimination motivated his dismissal from both the University’s 
graduate school and medical school.120  The Eleventh Circuit held that even if 
                                                 
 113. See Dorrian, supra note 18. 
 114. See, e.g., Sirpal v. Univ. of Miami, 509 F. App’x 924, 927 (11th Cir. 2013) (finding that 
the “cat’s paw” doctrine did not extend liability to the employer because it conducted a sufficient 
independent investigation prior to dismissing the plaintiff-employee); Chattman v. Toho Tenax 
Am., Inc., 686 F.3d 339, 353 (6th Cir. 2012) (holding that the employer’s investigation was not 
sufficiently independent to absolve it of vicarious liability); Jennings v. Ill. Dep’t of Corr., 496 F.3d 
764, 765–66 (7th Cir. 2007) (demonstrating how employers can avoid vicarious liability by 
conducting independent investigations before terminating employees); see generally U.S. EQUAL 
EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE: VICARIOUS EMPLOYER LIABILITY FOR 
UNLAWFUL HARASSMENT BY SUPERVISORS (June 18, 1999), https://www.eeoc.gov/policy/do 
cs/harassment.pdf (last modified Mar. 29, 2010) [hereinafter EEOC ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE]. 
 115. The EEOC’s use of the word harassment can be used interchangeably with discrimination.  
See EEOC ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 114, at 1–2 (“While the anti-discrimination 
statutes seek to remedy discrimination, their primary purpose is to prevent violations. The Supreme 
Court, in Faragher and Ellerth, relied on Commission guidance which has long advised employers 
to take all necessary steps to prevent harassment.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 116. Id. at 14. 
 117. Id. at 15. 
 118. Id. 
 119. 509 F. App’x 924 (11th Cir. 2013). 
 120. Id. at 925–26.  The independent investigations revealed that Sirpal had engaged in 
misconduct and unethical behavior in the graduate school’s lab where he worked and that there 
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Sirpal’s claims of racial discrimination were true, this was not a “cat’s paw” case 
because “each school conducted some sort of investigation,” both of which 
determined that, notwithstanding evidence of peripheral racial animus, his 
dismissal was justified by his misconduct and unethical behavior.121  The court 
noted that the investigations were sufficiently independent to support such a 
finding because each one included a hearing at which Sirpal was able to testify.  
Then, after the decision to dismiss him was reached by the Graduate Committee, 
Sirpal was able to appeal the decision to the Associate Dean for Graduate 
Studies.122 
Jennings v. Illinois Department of Corrections,123 provides another example 
of a sufficient independent investigation.  This case involved a Title VII claim 
filed by a Mexican-American prison guard who was terminated for smuggling 
contraband cigars into the prison and trading them with inmates.124  The prison’s 
warden initiated an independent investigation upon discovering cigars in the 
possession of an inmate.125 
Eight inmates were interviewed before the investigator concluded that 
Jennings had engaged in the prohibited conduct.  Based on the results of the 
investigation, a disciplinary hearing was held before the Employee Review 
Board, which in turn recommended a discharge.126  After Jennings was officially 
terminated, an independent arbitrator upheld the termination finding that the 
termination “was appropriate in light of the seriousness of the misconduct and 
Jennings’ recent disciplinary history.”127  The Seventh Circuit found that the 
independent investigation conducted by the independent investigator and 
subsequent arbitration were sufficient to break “any connection between [the 
supervisor’s alleged] improper motivations” and the adverse action.128 
                                                 
were some serious questions regarding the data he used in an article he was writing for the medical 
school.  Id. at 927. 
 121. Id. (“Therefore, even if Sirpal’s supervisor, Dr. Potter, had submitted to the Graduate 
Committee a report that ‘rubberstamped’ the discriminatory animus of Sirpal’s harassers as Sirpal 
alleges, this is not a cat’s paw case because the independent investigation determined that dismissal 
was, apart from Dr. Potter’s recommendation, entirely justified.”). 
 122. Noting the thoroughness of the appeal process, the Eleventh Circuit emphasized that “Dr. 
John Bixby, Associate Dean for Graduate Studies for the medical school, met with the Graduate 
Committee members, the University Security Officer who had investigated one of the allegations 
of misconduct, the lab manager, Ms. Jones, and Sirpal.”  Id. 
 123. 496 F.3d 764 (7th Cir. 2007). 
 124. Id. at 765.  Jennings claimed he was fired because of his national origin and presented 
evidence of discriminatory remarks made about him and other Hispanic employees, including that 
he was called a “lazy Mexican” shortly before he was investigated.  Id. at 766. 
 125. Id. at 765. 
 126. Id. at 765–66. 
 127. Id. at 766. 
 128. The Seventh Circuit noted that there was no evidence that the warden, the investigator, or 
the arbitrator “bore any discriminatory animus towards Mexican-Americans or Jennings’ in 
particular.”  Id. at 769. 
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In contrast, Chattman v. Toho Tenax America, Inc.129 is an example of 
circumstances when a court held that an independent investigation did not 
absolve the employer from “cat’s paw” liability.  Chattman involved a Title VII 
claim alleging that an African American employee’s disqualification from 
promotion considerations was based on a disciplinary action issued against him 
by his racially-biased supervisor.130  The Sixth Circuit held that the investigation 
conducted by the employer did not protect it from liability because the 
supervisor “was ‘involved in some parts of the discussion’ regarding Chattman’s 
discipline and non-promotion.”131  It further found that the investigation was not 
entirely unrelated to the HR manager’s biased recommendation because the 
manager “both misinformed and selectively informed [the ultimate decision-
maker] about the incident.”132 
C.  Practitioner Tips 
Although both the EEOC guidelines and judicial decisions do not generally 
provide clear-cut standards for sufficient independent investigations, there are a 
few key measures employers can put into practice to ensure that a sufficient 
independent investigation is conducted.133 
First, interview both the employee making the report or recommendation and 
the subject of the report or recommendation, and review all evidence proffered 
by each.134  Second, interview all witnesses to the alleged wrongdoing or others 
who may have knowledge of the complaint, and review any additional evidence 
they may provide.  Finally, make certain the investigation remains impartial at 
                                                 
 129. 686 F.3d 339 (6th Cir. 2012). 
 130. As evidence that his supervisor was biased against African Americans, Chattman pointed 
to two instances in which his supervisor made racially hostile statements.  First, in response to 
another employee’s comment about her son fighting at school, the supervisor allegedly responded, 
“[y]ou know what my grandmother always says about boys scuffling?  That’s how the nigger 
graveyard got full.”  Then, when commenting on then-Presidential-candidate Barack Obama, the 
supervisor said, “[w]ell you better look close at Obama’s running mate because Americans won’t 
allow a nigger president.”  Id. at 343. 
 131. Id. at 353. 
 132. Id. 
 133. See Aaron J. Graf, Avoiding and Defending Claims of Cat’s Paw Liability in Employment 
Discrimination Cases, WDC JOURNAL (Mar. 21, 2016), http://www.wdc-online.org/wdc-journal/ 
archived-editions/avoiding-and-defending-claims-cats-paw-liability-employment (“[I]t can be said 
that a cat’s paw theory is unlikely to be brought, or will easily be defeated, where the decision 
maker: (1) performs their own independent investigation of the grounds supporting the employment 
action; (2) relies almost exclusively on testimony or documents created by unbiased or disinterested 
individuals instead of on the individual initially making the recommendation; and (3) provides the 
employee a brief opportunity to rebut or disprove the allegations.”). 
 134. For recommendations regarding guidelines for independent investigations, see Rachel 
Santoro, Comment, Narrowing the Cat’s Paw: An Argument for a Uniform Subordinate Bias 
Liability Standard, 11 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 823, 836–41 (2009), and see also Katherine González-
Valentín, Who’s Burning Now? Avoiding “Cat’s Paw” Liability Through Proper Predisciplinary 
Investigation, 59 FED. LAW. 20, 22 (2012). 
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all stages by ensuring the employee reporting the wrongdoing or making the 
recommendation has no authority or influence over the investigator.  This 
includes ensuring the employee reporting the wrongdoing or making the 
recommendation is not involved in discussions regarding the investigation 
beyond his or her report or recommendation. 
Furthermore, employers can minimize the risk of liability in “cat’s paw” 
claims by: (1) adopting, educating, and training all employees—supervisors and 
lower-level alike—on anti-discrimination and anti-retaliation policies; (2) 
keeping detailed disciplinary and performance records; and (3) making sure that 
all similarly-situated employees are subject to similar disciplinary actions.135 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Second Circuit’s recognition of “cat’s paw” liability in co-worker 
discrimination and retaliation claims represents a positive step in the attempt to 
protect employees from discrimination and is an effective response to the 
nationwide problem of workplace discrimination and retaliation.136  Other 
Circuits should adopt the First and Second Circuit’s expansion of “cat’s paw” 
cases to co-workers. Further, the expansion of the “cat’s paw” doctrine to 
include co-worker bias should motivate employers to reexamine their existing 
personnel practices in order to eliminate discriminatory and retaliatory bias from 
playing a role in employment decisions.137 
Despite the positive impact that the Vasquez decision and the “cat’s paw” 
cases before it will have in employment discrimination law, they have left 
unanswered the standards employers should follow when conducting 
independent investigations in order to avoid “cat’s paw” liability.  Employers 
must keep in mind that an employee’s discriminatory or retaliatory actions may 
be a causal factor in an adverse employment action where there is no evidence 
that the adverse action was not justified for reasons apart from the biased 
employee’s report.  Although it is always important to thoroughly investigate 
                                                 
 135. This is a recommendation commonly made by human resources representatives across all 
industries.  See Ivo Becica, More than Just a Fable—Why the “Cat’s Paw” Matters for Employers, 
HR LEGALIST (Apr. 14, 2015), http://www.hrlegalist.com/2015/04/more-than-just-a-fable-why-
the-cats-paw-matters-for-employers/. 
 136. Discrimination continues to be a pervasive problem in the workplace.  In Fiscal Year 
2016, the EEOC received 91,503 charges and secured more than $482 million for victims of 
discrimination.  What You Should Know: EEOC’s Fiscal Year 2016 Highlights, U.S. EQUAL EMPL. 
OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/wysk/2016_highlights.cfm (last 
visited Apr. 6, 2018). 
 137. See, e.g., Legal Alert: Cat’s Paw Theory of Discrimination Adopted by 2nd Circuit, 
FISHER PHILLIPS (Aug. 30, 2016), https://www.fisherphillips.com/resources-alerts-cat-s-paw-theor 
y-of-discrimination-adopted-by-2nd-circuit; Brian Hall, 2nd Circuit “Cat’s Paw” Decision 
Highlights Importance of Employer Investigations Before Termination, PORTER WRIGHT: 
EMPLOYER L. REP. (Sept. 6, 2016), https://www.employerlawreport.com/2016/09/articles/traps-
for-the-unwary/2nd-circuit-cats-paw-decision-highlights-importance-of-employer-investigations-
before-termination/. 
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discrimination complaints with a critical eye toward potential bias, the Second 
Circuit’s decision makes it even more so. 
Until clear standards are provided for deciding when an investigation will be 
sufficiently independent, it will be left to the courts to define what constitutes a 
“sufficient independent investigation” that absolves employers from liability in 
“cat’s paw” claims.  Thus, employers must take discrimination and retaliation 
complaints seriously by verifying that adverse employment actions are justified, 
properly supported, and based on non-discriminatory reasons. 
 
